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Two-Period Supply Chain Coordination Strategies with Ambidextrous 
Sustainable Innovations 
 
Abstract: This study considers a manufacturer with ambidextrous sustainable innovation 
capability selling products in environmentally conscious market through an independent retailer 
in a two-period game setting. We design a two-period game theoretic and dyadic supply chain 
(SC) model considering exploitative and exploratory nature of environmental innovations. We 
study five different contract types, viz. wholesale price contract, vertical Nash game structure, 
cost sharing contract, revenue sharing contract and two-part tariff contract. We demonstrate the 
impact of market sensitivity towards sustainable innovation and cost parameters on optimal 
level of decision parameters. The equilibrium results reveal that a suitably designed two-part 
tariff contract can be used to achieve coordination in a fragmented SC. The equilibrium results 
assist managers to optimise the SC based on the two-period contract model. The results 
obtained in this study can help the decision-makers to take decisions on investment in the 
ambidextrous sustainable innovation under different types of contract structures. 
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Investment in sustainability leads to innovations which yield both net earnings and growth in 
sales revenue (Nidumolu et al., 2009; Hartmann and Vachon, 2018; Hizarci‐Payne et al., 
2021). The sustainability is being viewed as a source of innovation and new growth among 
business managers (KPMG, 2017; Wicki and Hansen, 2019; Wang, 2020). The extant 
literature discusses two basic forms of innovation that enhances the environmental 
performance, viz., exploratory and exploitative (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; Awan et al., 
2021). A business organisation that pursues exploitative (continuous) innovation builds on 
existing knowledge, whereas an organisation that pursues exploratory (disruptive) innovation 
relies on radical change built on new knowledge (Kim and Huh, 2015). The new knowledge 
thorough exploratory innovation could be regarding the development of more sustainable 
new product and services for existing customers, or developing product for new segments. 
For example, Abbott Laboratories is a medical devices and healthcare company that has 
achieved a high growth through disruptive innovations in medical devices and diagnostics 
and opened up several new markets in developing countries (Ahlstrom, 2010).  
 
Through exploitative innovations, business organisations continuously strive to improve 
their existing products, processes and technologies. Proponent of this strategy for 
sustainability argues that it is based on addressing environmental and social issues thereby 
contributing to profit maximisation (Hosseini-Motlagh et al., 2019; Phan et al., 2019; Raza, 
2018). For instance, GM’s Flint plant in Michigan is saving approximately 174,299 kWh 
energy per year by shutting down plant during holidays (El Bizat, 2006). Instead of venting to 
the atmosphere, Statoil injects more than 1 million tonnes of CO2 per year underneath the 
North Sea bed to save paying carbon tax to Norway (Stefan and Paul, 2008).  
The gains from the exploratory innovations are not immediate. The exploratory 
innovations require concentrated efforts for a longer time periods and may not result in direct 
visible savings in the same time period when we invest into it. A lot of disruptive sustainable 
innovations have brought additional purchasers into the markets earlier who could not 
consume or meet the expense of the conventional product (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; 
Jakhar et al., 2020).  
A firm engaging in both innovation strategies as discussed above is termed as 
ambidextrous (Lin et al., 2017). The recent development of ambidexterity stems from the 
recognition that exploration engenders prospects that an organisation can later exploit (Kim 
and Atuahene‐Gima, 2010; Lavie et al., 2010; Mueller et al., 2013). Gupta et al. (2006) 
discussed ambidextrous innovative behaviour of Cisco and other firms in the semiconductor 
industry. Knott (2002) observed that exploration and exploitation coexisted in Toyota’s 
product development system. The Toyota Fuel Cell System is an excellent example that 
includes both fuel cell technology and hybrid technology based ambidextrous sustainability 
innovation practices. 
There are three ways to measure ambidextrous innovations as subtracting (He and Wong, 
2004), multiplying (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004), and adding (Jansen et al., 2006, 2009; 
Kortmann et al., 2014) of exploratory and exploitative innovations. However, it has been 
proved that the additive model possesses greater explanatory power as compared to the other 
two approaches (see Jansen et al., 2009, p. 803 for a detailed analysis). 
1.1. Research questions and goals 
Motivated by the above background where the firms invest in the exploratory and 
exploitative innovation, we propose that environmental innovation has a two-pronged 
impact: (i) reduction in cost due to eco-efficiency and (ii) the expansion of emerging markets 
(e.g., the bottom of the pyramid). Moreover, investment in sustainability will cause an 
 
increase in demand due to environmentally conscious buyers in the existing markets (Figure 
1). 
The extant literature considers environmental innovation in various models (Hong and 
Guo, 2019; Shen et al., 2019; Xie et al., 2019; Nguyen et al., 2020). In sustainability 
literature, these two strategies are known as eco-efficiency and eco-branding, respectively 
(Orsato, 2006). Whereas the competitive focus of eco-efficiency strategy is on a 
manufacturing/service process, the competitive focus of eco-branding strategy is on the 
output of a manufacturing/service process. It is fundamental to recognize that focusing on 
eco-efficiency is not equivalent to focusing on eco-branding (or vice versa). One strategy is 
about reducing the environmental impact of a product during its manufacturing stage (e.g., 
using renewable energy sources to power the manufacturing plant, reducing water usage 
during the production process), whereas the other is about reducing the environmental 
impact of a product during its use stage (e.g., increasing the energy efficiency of a washer 
unit). Raz et al. (2013) examine a firm’s design for the environment efforts that change the 
product’s environmental impacts in each life-cycle stage and therefore its overall 
environmental impact. In their model, the cost to produce the product is decreasing in the 
innovation effort for the manufacturing stage (i.e. exploitative innovation), whereas end-
customer demand is stochastic and depends on the use stage innovation effort (i.e., 
exploratory innovation). However, the most of literature overlooks the exploratory and 
exploitative nature of environmental innovation. This study takes breakthrough step and 
considers ambidextrous nature of sustainable innovation, and demonstrates the effectiveness 
of the two-period contract structure. Although some two-period contract models are available 
in literature (Chakraborty et al., 2019; Hartwig et al., 2015; Merckx and Chaturvedi, 2020; 
Pan et al., 2009), they do not consider exploratory and exploitative nature of environmental 
innovation. Driven by the above discussion the following research questions are posed: 
• How an analytical model can be formed by simultaneously considering exploratory and 
exploitative nature of environmental innovation? 
• In a dyadic supply chain, how does the decision maker’s investment in environmental 
innovation influence the measures of supply chain performance? And, in which contract 
structure, the supply chain performance is better? 
• What are the changes in optimal level of decision parameters of a two-period contract 
model considering ambidextrous nature of sustainable innovation? 
 
• What is the impact of market sensitivity towards environmental innovation and its cost 
parameters on the measures of supply chain performance in a two-period contract 
setting? 
• What is the impact of exploratory and exploitative nature of environmental innovation 
on the measures of supply chain performance in a two-period contract setting? 
To address these questions, we design a two-period game theoretic and dyadic supply chain 
model considering simultaneously exploitative and exploratory nature of environmental 
innovations. The manufacturer, assumed to be a Stackelberg leader, invests in ambidextrous 
sustainable innovations. We discuss five different contract types, viz. wholesale price contract 
(WSP), vertical Nash game structure(VN), cost sharing contract (CSC), revenue sharing 
contract (RSC), and two-part tariff contract (2PT). First, we study wholesale price contract. As 
this contract structure leads to sub-optimal solution failing to coordinate the supply chain, we 
discuss vertical Nash game structure relaxing the assumption of Stackelberg structure. 
Subsequently, we consider other three different contracts, viz. CSC, RSC and 2PT. 
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Figure 1: Impact of environmental investment 
1.2. Research contribution 
This study contributes to the literature in multiple ways. Firstly, we develop a two-period 
contract setting with ambidextrous sustainable innovations. Second, we study a two-period 
game using five different contract types and delineate its effectiveness using numerical 
examples. Third, we discuss the nature of changes in the level of optimal value of decision 
parameters in ambidextrous sustainable innovation based on the two-period contract setting. 
Fourth, we analyse the impact of consumer sensitivity of sustainable innovation and 
sustainable cost parameter on the decision parameters of the two-period contract models. 
 
Fifth, we analyse the impact of exploratory and exploitative nature of environmental 
innovation in the two-period contract setting.  
1.3. Knowledge gaps 
The literature limits their analysis to supply chain coordination while considering the trade-off 
between “cost of sustainability” and increase in demand due to “environmental conscious 
buying”. Analytical research on different types of sustainable innovations in product, process 
and value chain in supply chain coordination is scant. In particular, investigation of supply 
contracts with the integration of the exploratory and exploitative sustainable innovations is a 
knowledge gap in the extant literature. Designing contracts while considering both type of 
sustainable innovation may eliminate both environmental concerns and discoordination 
among supply chain partners. This article considers both the dimensions of innovation (i.e. 
exploratory and exploitative) with various contracts to attain sustainable supply chain 
coordination. 
Moreover, the extant literature on coordination mechanisms and strategies with 
sustainability also assumes that the sustainable innovation does not change the marginal cost 
of manufacturers. We deviate from the extant literature by proposing that the supply chains 
invest in sustainable products and technology not only to satisfy environmentally conscious 
consumers but also to reduce material/production costs and to develop new markets. We 
consider two possible scenarios for investment in sustainable innovation, viz. (i) exploitative 
sustainable innovation and (ii) exploratory innovation. The exploitative sustainable innovation 
makes existing products more sustainable by reducing the consumption of material and 
energy. The resultant impact is cost saving (e.g. through low cost of production). The 
exploratory innovation develops new products and markets which will come with a time lag 
as exploration takes time. In this article we consider one period time lag. 
This article attempts to address these knowledge gaps by considering two types of 
sustainable innovation in a two-period setting. We explain a game theoretic model for supply 
chain coordination (Cachon, 2003; Chen and Nie, 2020), and demonstrate the impact of 
sustainable innovation on demand and cost of a product. The game theoretic method is 
extensively used in literature to analyse the interaction between two or more players (Yazan et 
al., 2020). In this context, we analyse four contracts, viz. WSP, RSC, CSC and linear 2PT 
contract using non-cooperative game theory. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The study model, its assumptions, 
and game constructs are presented in section 2. Section 3 details the results of the analysis. 
 
Finally, section 4 elucidates conclusions and future research direction. 
 
2. The Model 
Consider a dyadic supply chain (SC) consisting of a manufacturer and retailer (Figure 2). 
The manufacturer supplies only one type of product while the retailer sells that product. 
Both the supply chain partners are considered to be individually rational (voluntary 
participation) and risk neutral (linear utility function) in nature. The manufacturer and 
retailer are assumed to be the Stackelberg leader and follower respectively. Consumers are 
sensitive towards environmental issues. The manufacturer performs incremental and radical 
in-nature sustainable innovations. For the radical innovation, the market potential of period 
(t+1) is linearly dependent on sustainable innovation level of period t (Christensen and 
Raynor, 2003), thus 𝑎𝑡+1 = 𝑎𝑡 + 𝛾𝜃𝑡. With incremental innovation, the manufacturer 
improves its processes and becomes more efficient which results in reduction of production 
cost in the second period (Sharma and Henriques, 2005) which is expressed as: 𝑐𝑡+1 = 𝑐𝑡 −
𝛽𝜃𝑡. The linear, deterministic demand function with negative and positive correlation with 
price and sustainable innovation level is considered in our study as: 𝑞𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 + 𝛼𝜃𝑡 . 
Similar demand function is used in previous studies on single period contract models 
(Swami and Shah, 2013). 
The selling price consists cost plus profit margin (Choi, 1991). Mathematically, 𝑝𝑡 =
𝑤𝑡 + 𝑚𝑡. The cost of sustainable innovation is supposed to be the quadratic function of level 
of sustainable innovation (Swami and Shah, 2013), which is 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝐼𝜃𝑡
2. 
Table 1 provides the notations used in this model. 
2.1. Centralised supply chain 
In the ‘coordination’ literature, the centralised case provides benchmark solution. In the 
centralised SC, the owner decides the level of sustainable innovation (𝜃1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜃2 ), retail 
prices (𝑝1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝2), and order quantity (𝑞1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑞2). In the first period, the chain owner fixes 
the level of retail price (𝑝1) and sustainable innovation (𝜃1). Similarly, in the second period, 
the chain owner fixes the level of retail price (𝑝2) and sustainable innovation (𝜃2). The 
backward induction method is used to derive the optimal decision parameters of the two-
period model. In this case, first of all, the equilibrium level of decision parameters (𝜃2𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝2 
) of the second period are derived and then, based on results of second period, the equilibrium 
level of decision parameters (𝜃1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝1 ) of the first period are derived. In case of the 
 
centralised SC, the profit function 𝜋𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇 is jointly concave in (𝑝, 𝜃) when ( 4𝐼 − 𝛼
2) >
2(𝛽 + 𝛾)√𝐼. The equilibrium results for the centralised SC are illustrated in Table 2. The 
steps of proof of equilibrium results are provided in Table A of Appendix and derivations are 
given in online supplementary material. 
 
Table 1:  The notations used in the model 
Sl. No. Parameters, decision variables and coordination strategies Notations 
1 Market potential in period 𝑡 𝑎𝑡 
2 Consumer sensitivity to price 𝑏 
3 Per unit variable cost of manufacturer in period 𝑡 𝑐𝑡 
4 Consumer sensitivity to sustainable innovation 𝛼 
5 Cost reduction coefficient due to sustainable innovation 𝛽 
6 
Market development coefficient due to sustainable 
innovation 
𝛾 
7 Sustainable innovation level in period 𝑡 𝜃𝑡 
8 Cost parameter of sustainable innovation I 
9 Margin of retailer in period 𝑡 𝑚𝑡 
10 Wholesale price of manufacturer in period 𝑡 𝑤𝑡 
11 Retail price in period 𝑡 𝑝𝑡 
12 Demand in period t 𝑞𝑡 
13 Aggregate profit of the manufacturer 𝜋𝑀 
14 Aggregate profit of the retailer 𝜋𝑅 
15 Aggregate profit of the supply chain 𝜋𝑆𝐶 
16 Manufacturer’s profit in period 1 and 2 𝜋𝑃1
𝑀  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜋𝑃2
𝑀  
17 Retailer’s profit in period 1 and 2 𝜋𝑃1
𝑅  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜋𝑃2
𝑅  
18 Supply chain profit in period 1 and 2 𝜋𝑃1
𝑆𝐶  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜋𝑃2
𝑆𝐶  
19 Vertical Nash game VN 
20 Centralised decision making CENT 
Note: For the first period, 𝑎 and 𝑐 is used in the place of 𝑎1 and 𝑐1 respectively, i.e. Market 
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Figure 2:  The model 
2.2. Vertical Nash game 
 
The vertical Nash game structure assumes that all the SC agents have similar market power. 
In the initial period, the retailer decides 𝑚1 and the manufacturer decides 𝑤1 and 𝜃1 
simultaneously. Based on the response function of the initial period, in the second period, 
the retailer decides 𝑚2 and the manufacturer decides 𝑤2 and 𝜃2 simultaneously. The 
backward induction method is used to compute the optimal decision parameters of the 
vertical Nash game in the two-period model. In this scenario, first the equilibrium results for 
the second period are derived. Then based on the response functions of the second period, 
the equilibrium results of first period are derived. In other words, in the second period, the 
retailer decides 𝑚2 and the manufacturer decides 𝑤2 and 𝜃2 simultaneously. After getting 
the results of the second period, the retailer decides 𝑚1 and the manufacturer decides 𝑤1 and 
𝜃1 simultaneously in the first period. The equilibrium results for the vertical Nash game are 
presented in Table 2. The steps of proof of equilibrium results are provided in Table A of 
Appendix and derivations are given in the online supplementary material. 
2.3. Wholesale price contract 
In the scenario, the manufacturer is considered as the market leader in the Stackelberg game 
while the retailer is considered as a follower. In the first period, based on the response 
function of the retailer, the manufacturer sets the wholesale price (𝑤1) and level of 
sustainable innovation (𝜃1). Then the retailer decides their profit margin (𝑚1) using the 
values of 𝑤1 and 𝜃1. Similarly, in the second period, based on the response function of the 
retailer, the manufacturer sets the wholesale price (𝑤2) and level of sustainable innovation 
(𝜃2). The retailer decides their profit margin (𝑚2) using the level of 𝑤2 and 𝜃2. The 
equilibrium results for the second period are derived using the backward induction method, 
and then, based on the response functions of the second period, the equilibrium results for 
first period are derived. Similarly, in the first period, based on the response function of 
second period, the retailer decides their profit margin (𝑚1). Finally, in the last stage of the 
game, the manufacturer decides their level of wholesale price (𝑤1) and sustainable 
innovation (𝜃1) depending on the profit margin of the retailer (𝑚1). The equilibrium results 
for the two-period WSP contract are presented in Table 2. The steps of proof of equilibrium 
results are provided in Table A of Appendix. Derivations are given in the online 
supplementary material. 
2.4. Cost sharing contract 
In this contract, the retailer contributes a portion of the total cost of the sustainable 
 
innovation and if the manufacturer agrees to the offer, remaining fraction of sustainable 
innovation cost is borne by them. Due to sharing of  cost by the retailer, the manufacturer 
can be motivated for sustainable performance. In the first period, first of all the retailer 
contributes 𝜓1fraction of the total cost of sustainability, and given the level of cost sharing 
fraction by the retailer, the manufacturer decides 𝑤1 and 𝜃1. The retailer decides their profit 
margin (𝑚1) considering 𝜓1, 𝑤1, and 𝜃1. Similarly, in the second period, the retailer shares 
𝜓2 fraction of the total cost of sustainability. Then with the given level of cost sharing by the 
retailer, the manufacturer decides 𝑤2 and 𝜃2. The retailer decides their profit margin (𝑚2) 
considering the level of  𝜓2, 𝑤2, and 𝜃2. Similar to the vertical Nash game and WSP 
contract, the backward induction method is used to compute the equilibrium results for the 
CSC. The equilibrium results for the second period are derived followed by the solution of 
the equilibrium results for the first period. The equilibrium results of the two-period CSC are 
presented in Table 2. The steps of proof of equilibrium results are provided in Table A of 
Appendix and derivations are given in the online supplementary material. 
2.5. Revenue sharing contract 
In this contract type, the retailer contributes a fraction of their revenue with the manufacturer 
to motivate the manufacturer to decrease the wholesale price, or increase the level of 
sustainability, or both. In the beginning of the first period, the retailer offers to share (1 −
𝜙1) fraction of revenue with the manufacturer. The retailer decides the level of the 
wholesale price (𝑤1) and sustainable innovation (𝜃1) if the manufacturer decides to accept 
the offer. Finally, the retailer decides their profit margin (𝑚1) considering the level of 𝜙1, 
𝑤1 and 𝜃1. Similarly, in the second period, considering the response function of the first 
period, the retailer offers to share (1 − 𝜙2) fraction of revenue with the manufacturer. If the 
manufacturer accepts the offer, the retailer decides the level of 𝑤2 and 𝜃2. Finally, the 
retailer decides their profit margin (𝑚2) considering the levels of 𝜙2, 𝑤2 and 𝜃2. Similar to 
vertical Nash game, WSP and CSC, the backward induction method is applied to compute 
the equilibrium results of the two-period RSC. The equilibrium results of two-period RSC 
are presented in Table 2. The steps of proof of equilibrium results are provided in Table A of 
Appendix and derivations are given in the online supplementary material. 
2.6. Two-part tariff contract 
A linear two-part tariff (2PT) contract is considered where the manufacturer sets a lump-sum 
payment, level of sustainable innovation and wholesale price. From the level of lump-sum 
 
payment, sustainable innovation and wholesale price, the retailer decides the retail price. In 
the first period the manufacturer decides the lump-sum fee (𝑙1), level of sustainable 
innovation (𝜃1), and wholesale price (𝑤1), and then the retailer fixes their profit margin (𝑚1) 
considering the levels of 𝑙1, 𝜃1, and 𝑤1.  Similarly, in the second period, the manufacturer 
decides 𝑙2, 𝜃2 and 𝑤2, and the retailer decides their profit margin (𝑚2) considering the levels 
of  𝑙2, 𝜃2 and 𝑤2. The backward induction method is applied to compute the equilibrium 
results of the two-period linear 2PT contract. In the first period, the retailer arrives at 𝑚1 
considering the response functions of the first period and the response function of the 
manufacturer. At the end of the event, after considering the decision of the retailer on their 
profit margin (𝑚1), the manufacturer decides 𝑙1, 𝜃1 and 𝑤1. The equilibrium results of the 
two-period 2PT contract are presented in Table 2. The steps of proof of equilibrium results 
are provided in Table A of Appendix, and derivations are given in the online supplementary 
material. 
3. Results and Discussion 
This section presents the propositions derived through algebraic comparisons. The proofs of 
all the propositions are given in the online supplementary material. A numerical analysis is 
performed to compare the optimal results obtained for different contract types. Finally, the 
sensitivity analysis of the results is presented.   
Proposition 1: In case of the two-period contract, the optimal level of the retail price 
follows the following order: 










Proposition 1 demonstrates that for the WSP contract, the optimal level of retail price is 
higher in the second period than that of the first period. The same is the case for the 2PT 
contract and centralised SC. This proposition further demonstrates that in case of the 2PT 
contract, the optimal level of the retail price can be equated with the centralised SC. The 
reason for the same is that the one-time payment becomes sunk cost and the 2PT contract SC 
behaves like a centralised SC.  
Proposition 2: In case of the two-period contract, the optimal levels of sustainable 
innovation are in order of: 
(a)  𝜃𝑊𝑆𝑃−𝑃1 > 𝜃𝑊𝑆𝑃−𝑃2 , 
 
(b)  𝜃2𝑃𝑇−𝑃1 = 𝜃𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇−𝑃1 > 𝜃2𝑃𝑇−𝑃2 = 𝜃𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇−𝑃2.  
Proposition 2 demonstrates that for the WSP, 2PT, CSC and vertical Nash game, the 
optimal level of sustainable innovation is less in the second period than the period one. The 
reason is the time lag for the benefit due to exploratory innovation. No future period is 
attached to the second period. Moreover, the other explanation could be diminishing 
marginal return as the low hanging fruits are plucked in the first period. This proposition 
further demonstrates that in the 2PT contract, the optimal level of the sustainable innovation 
can be equated to the optimal level of the sustainable innovation in the centralised SC for 
both the periods. 
Proposition 3: For the two-period contract, the equilibrium level of the order quantity 
follows the following order: 
(a) 𝑞𝑊𝑆𝑃−𝑃2 > 𝑞𝑊𝑆𝑃−𝑃1  if (8I-α
2) > 2√2𝐼(β+γ), 
(b)  𝑞2𝑃𝑇−𝑃2 = 𝑞𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇−𝑃2 > 𝑞2𝑃𝑇−𝑃1 = 𝑞𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇−𝑃1. 
Proposition 3 demonstrates that in the case of the WSP, 2PT contract, and vertical Nash 
game, the optimal level of the order quantity is higher in the second period than the optimal 
level of the order quantity in the first period. The increase in the order size is due to an 
increase in market size because of the radical innovations. This proposition further illustrates 
that for the 2PT contract, the optimal level of order quantity can be equated to the optimal 
level of order quantity in the centralised SC in both the periods. 
Proposition 4: In case of the two-period contract, the profit of the retailer follows the 
following order 𝜋𝑊𝑆𝑃−𝑃2
𝑅 > 𝜋𝑊𝑆𝑃−𝑃1
𝑅 ,    𝜋2𝑃𝑇−𝑃2
𝑅 =  𝜋2𝑃𝑇−𝑃1
𝑅 . 
Proposition 4 demonstrates that in case of the WSP contract, the optimal level of the 
profit of the retailer is higher in the second period than the optimal level of the profit of the 
retailer in the first period. The retailer is benefited by an increase in the market size which 
reflects an increase in the profit of the second period. However, the benefit of the cost 
reduction may not be transferred to the retailer by the manufacturer as we can see in 
Proposition 1 that retail price is higher in the second period. This proposition further exhibits 
that the optimal level of the profit for the retailer is same in both the periods in 2PT contract. 
This is due to the fact that the manufacturer may be barging for higher upfront payment in 
the second period as they are investing for the sustainable innovation. Moreover, the 
manufacturer only invests in the sustainable innovations. The following section presents 
numerical simulation results and graphical analysis to study the impacts of model parameters 
on the equilibrium results in different channel structures. The following parameter values are 
 
considered in our study: 𝑎1 = 500, 𝑐1 = 20, 𝐼 = 8.5 𝑡𝑜 10.5, 𝛼 = 2.5 𝑡𝑜 4, 𝛾 = 1 𝑡𝑜 2.4, 
𝛽 = 0 𝑡𝑜 0.7, and ?̅?𝑅 = 100000.   
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𝑝𝑊𝑆𝑃−𝑃1 = [𝑐 +
6𝐼(𝑎−𝑐){(𝛽+𝛾)(𝛽+𝛾−𝛼)−(8𝐼−𝛼2)}
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𝑝2𝑃𝑇−𝑃1 = [𝑐 +
2𝐼(𝑎−𝑐){(𝛽+𝛾)(𝛽+𝛾−𝛼)−(4𝐼−𝛼2)}
{4𝐼(𝛽+𝛾)2−(4𝐼−𝛼2)2}

















𝑅 =2?̅?𝑅, 𝑤2𝑃𝑇−𝑃1 = 𝑐 
Note: The details of alias used in Table 2  are given in Appendix A.1. 
 
3.1. Effect of consumer sensitivity to sustainable innovation 
The numerical parameter values for the analysis in this section are chosen in a way to satisfy 
the conditions of profit function concavity, along with demand functions positivity 
(conditions are provided in the online supplementary material) and satisfy the assumptions 
of model. It is observed from Figures 3 and 4 that consumer sensitivity to the sustainable 
innovation (𝛼) has increasing impact on sustainable innovation level (𝜃) (Figure 3a), retail 
price (𝑝) (Figure 3b), order quantity (𝑞) (Figure 4(a)), and profit of retailer (𝜋𝑅) (Figure 
4(b)). However, the rate of increase is different for different contract types. Further, the 
consumer sensitivity to the sustainable innovation has mixed impact on the profit of the 
manufacturer (Figures 5(a) and 5(b)). In the first period, the profit of the manufacturer (𝜋𝑀) 
 
decreases with the increase in consumer sensitivity to the sustainable innovation for the 
cases of vertical Nash game and CSC. However, for the WSP and RSC, first it increases 
then decreases with the increase in consumer sensitivity to the sustainable innovation 
(Figure 5(a)). In the second period, 𝜋𝑀 increases with the increase in 𝛼. For a 2PT contract, 
the 𝜋𝑀 decreases in the first period whereas it increases in the second period (Figure 5(a)). 
The aggregate profit of the manufacturer, retailer and total supply increases with an increase 
in consumer sensitivity to the sustainable innovation. These interesting results provide a 
justification regarding why there is a need to analyse contracts for sustainability for multiple 
time periods. Furthermore, it also provides a key guidance to the SC managers regarding 
how the manufacturer is going to behave with respect to deciding investment level for the 
sustainable innovations. For example, for the WSP and RSC, there is an optimal investment 
level for a given customer sensitivity level of sustainable. Moreover, for the vertical Nash, 
CSC and 2PT contract, the manufacture should consider both the periods together for 
deciding the optimal investment level. If the manufacturer considers only a single period, 
then the investment is going to be lowered as compared with both the periods. These results 
justify the needs to consider multi-period setting while analysing the level of sustainability 
by the manufacture in different contract types. 
Figure 3(a) shows that the level of sustainable innovation in the second period (𝜃𝑃2) is 
lower than the level of sustainable innovation in the first period (𝜃𝑃1) for all the contract 
types. One of the reasons behind this is a time lag for benefit accrual in terms of reduction in 
cost and increase in market size. Further, there is no future associated with the second (and 
last) period, therefore, the manufacturer invests less. The other reason could be diminishing 
marginal return in cost saving or increase in the market size. However, this also depends on 
contract types. 
The optimal level of sustainable innovation (𝜃) is the highest in the 2PT contract and 
centralised supply chain (CENT) and it is the lowest in the WSP (Figure 3(a)). The lower 
level of sustainable innovation for some contracts (e.g. WSP) is due to the problem of double 
marginalisation and externality. The cost for sustainability is absorbed by the manufacture but 
benefits are shared with the retailer specifically for increase in the market size. However, in 
case of the 2PT contract the manufacture may barging for higher upfront fee for the second 
period that repay cost incurred and the resultant benefit of the sustainable innovation. As 
shown in Figure 3(b), the retail price is higher in the second period as compared with the first 
period for all cases, viz. CENT, 2PT, RSC, CSC, vertical Nash game, and WSP contract. The 
 
lower level of price in the first period can help to attract the customer in the first period, 
however the increased market size due to radical sustainable innovation can help the retailer 
to charge more in the second period. The analysis also suggests that as the level of 
sustainability increases, product becomes more costlier (Paparoidamis et al., 2019).  
 
 
Figure 3: Impact of 𝛼 𝑜𝑛 𝜃 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝 
 
From Figure 4(a), it is observed that the order quantity (equivalent to the demand) of the 
product is higher in the second period as compared with the demand in the first period. Figure 
4(a) also illustrates that the order quantity is highest in the CENT and 2PT contract, and it is 
the lowest in the WSP contract. In the WSP contract the retailer pays same amount for every 
unit purchased from the manufacturer where the expected profit (i.e. price × probability to 
able to sell) goes down and the retailer ends up ordering less units. 
It is apparent from Figure 4(b) that in case of the 2PT contract, the profit of the retailer is 
independent of the change in consumer sensitivity of the sustainable innovation (𝛼), while it 
shows an increasing trend in case of the RSC, CSC, WSP contract, and vertical Nash game 
structure. The profit of the retailer is higher in the second period as compared with the profit 
in the first period (Figure 5(b)) in case of the RSC, CSC, WSP contract, and vertical Nash 





Figure 4:  Impact of 𝛼 𝑜𝑛 𝑞 and 𝜋𝑅  
 
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) compare the 𝜋𝑀 in different game structures with respect to a change 
in consumer sensitivity to the sustainable innovation (𝛼). As shown in Figures 5(a) and 5(b), 
the 𝜋𝑀 is higher in the second period as compared with the first period. The reason behind this 
is the reduction of the cost due to exploratory innovations and increase in market size due to 
exploitative innovations. We also observe that the 𝜋𝑀 is the highest in the 2PT and RSC 
contracts and the lowest in the vertical Nash game structure. Moreover, the 𝜋𝑀 behaves 
differently in both the periods. The profit decreases in the first period and increases in the 
second period. The reason behind this is that as the consumer sensitivity towards sustainable 
products increases, the manufacturer invests more in sustainable innovations. This results in 
more upfront investment in period 1 which decreases it profitability in the same period. 
However, it results in more profitability in longer run as reflected in profit in second periods. 
These results indicate that the manufacture needs to account long term profitability while 
investing in the sustainable innovations. The short-term profitability orientation may not 




Figure 5: Impact of 𝛼 𝑜𝑛 𝜋𝑀 
 
3.2. Effect of cost reduction coefficient 
Figure 6(a) demonstrates the impact of cost reduction coefficient (𝛽) on the optimal level of 
sustainable innovation (𝜃) across the various contracts and game structures in a multi-period 
setting. The value of 𝛽 has an increasing impact on the level of sustainable innovation in all 
settings. Similar to the previous case (Figure 3(a)), the optimal level of sustainable 
innovation is lower in the second period as compared with the optimal level of sustainable 
innovation in the first period. Furthermore, the increasing impact of 𝛽 on the optimal level 
of sustainable innovation (𝜃) is higher in the CENT and 2PT contract as compared to RSC, 
CSC, WSP contract and vertical Nash game. We also find that difference between the 
sustainable innovation level of the first and second period is lower at a lower level of cost 
reduction coefficient as compared with the higher values of the cost reduction coefficient. 
Figure 6(b) highlights an interesting relationship between the cost reduction coefficient (𝛽) 
and retail price (𝑝). The 𝛽 has increasing impact on the retail price. Figure 6(b) also elucidates 
that in case of CENT, 2PT contract, CSC, WSP contract, and vertical Nash game, the 
difference between the retail price of the first and second periods is higher at the lower level 
cost reduction coefficient as compared with the higher level of the cost reduction coefficient. 
We get opposite result in case of the RSC. In case of the RSC, the difference between the 
retail price of the second and first periods is lower at the lower level of 𝛽 as compared with 
the higher level of 𝛽.  
As shown in Figure 7(a), the cost reduction coefficient (𝛽) has an increasing impact on the 
demand or order quantity of the product in both periods of the contracts. In case of the CENT, 
 
2PT contract, CSC, WSP contract and vertical Nash game, the order quantity of the second 
period is higher than the order quantity of the first period. We get the opposite result in case 
of the RSC, in which the order quantity of the first period is higher than the order quantity of 
the second period. In case of the CENT and 2PT contract, CSC, WSP contract and vertical 
Nash game, the difference between the order quantity of the second and first periods is lower 
at the lower level of the cost reduction coefficient as compared with the higher level of the 
coefficient. For the RSC the difference between order quantity of the first and second periods 
is lower at the lower level of the cost reduction coefficient. 
 
 
Figure 6:  Impact of 𝛽 𝑜𝑛 𝜃 and 𝑝 
 
Figure 7(b) presents the impact of the cost reduction on the profit of the manufacturer 
(𝜋𝑀). The value of 𝛽 has a mixed impact on 𝜋𝑀. In the first period of the contract, the profit 
decreases with an increase in the cost reduction coefficient, while in the second period, the 
profit increases with an increase in the cost reduction coefficient. Figure 7(b) also illustrates 
that the difference between the value of 𝜋𝑀 in the second and first periods increases with 
respect to an increase in the cost reduction coefficient.  
As shown in Figure 7(c), the cost reduction coefficient (𝛽) has a mixed impact on the 
optimal profit level of the retailer. The 𝛽 has a non-decreasing impact on the difference 
between the second and first periods profit level of the retailer. In case of the 2PT contract, 
the retailer’s profit is same in both the contract periods.  
In case of the RSC, CSC, WSP contract and vertical Nash game, the optimal profit level of 
the second period is higher than that of the first period. In case of the first period of the RSC 
and CSC, the optimal level of the retailer’s profit increases and then it decreases after a 
 
certain level of the coefficient. 
 
Figure 7:  Impact of 𝛽 𝑜𝑛 𝑞, 𝜋𝑀 and 𝜋𝑅 
 
3.3. Effect of sustainability cost parameter 
Figures 8(a), 8(b), 9(a) and 9(b) highlight the impact of the cost parameter of the sustainable 
innovation (I) on the retail price, order quantity, profit of the manufacturer, and profit of the 
retailer respectively. Interestingly the retail price decreases as the sustainable innovations 
become costlier (Figure 8). The reason behind this is that the costlier sustainable innovation 
becomes less attractive for the manufacturer to invest, which results in less demand from the 
sustainable sensitive customers. So, the retailer reduces the price to attract more customers. 
The rate of decrease is the highest for 2PT contract as the retailer paid upfront initial cost 
and needs more customer to recover the initial investment.  
The order quantity (Figure 8(b)) also decreases with an increase in the cost parameter of 
the sustainable innovation. The reason is the decrease in demand due to less investment in 
the sustainable innovations from the manufacturer. The profit of the manufacturer (Figure 
9(a)) decreases in the second period with an increase in the cost parameter of the sustainable 
innovation. The rate of decrease is the highest for the RSC. On the contrary there is a slight 
increase in the manufacturer’s profit for the first period. Due to the high cost for the 
sustainable innovation, the manufacturer tends to invest less and save some initial 
investment cost in the first period. However, this leads to significant reduction in the 
manufacturer’s profit in the second period. The profit of the retailer (Figure 9(b)) also shows 




Figure 8: Impact of 𝐼 𝑜𝑛 𝑝 and 𝑞 
  
 
Figure 9: Impact of 𝐼 𝑜𝑛 𝜋𝑀and 𝜋𝑅 
 
3.4. Effect of market development coefficient 
Figures 10(a) and 10(b) demonstrate the impact of market development coefficient (𝛾) on 
profit of the manufacturer and retailer respectively. Market development coefficient has 
overall increasing impact on the aggregate profit of the manufacturer, retailer and SC. 
However, it shows contrasting trend in both the periods. The profit of the manufacturer 
increases in the second period whereas it decreases in the first period with an increase in the 
value of the market development coefficient. For the retailer, it depends on contract type. In 
case of RSC and CSC it first increases and then decreases for the first period. For all other 
 
contract types, it increases in both the periods. It is profitable for the retailer to have vertical 
Nash as compared with the RSC when the market with development coefficient value is less 
than 1.8. However, the retailer earns more profit in the RSC when the market development 
coefficient value is greater than 1.8. These results provide valuable guidance to the retailer 
on the type of contract that maximises its profit for a given value of 𝛾. 
 
Figure 10: Impact of 𝛾 on 𝜋𝑀 and 𝜋𝑅 
 
4. Conclusions and Future Research Directions 
This study analyses the two-period supply chain coordination strategies with 
ambidextrous sustainable innovations. The manufacturer is responsible for investing in 
sustainable innovations and selling the product through an independent retailer. The study 
assumes that market is sensitive towards environmental performance. The model considers a 
linear, deterministic, price and ambidextrous sustainable innovation dependent demand 
function, i.e. 𝑞𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 + 𝛼𝜃𝑡. Due to the exploitative nature of the ambidextrous 
sustainable innovation, the marginal cost of the manufacturer in the period t+1 is considered 
to be dependent on the level of innovation in time period t, i.e. 𝑐𝑡+1 = 𝑐𝑡 − 𝛽𝜃𝑡. For the 
exploratory nature of innovation, the market potential for the period t+1 is assumed to be 
dependent on the level of innovation for the period t, i.e. 𝑎𝑡+1 = 𝑎𝑡 + 𝛾𝜃𝑡. This study 
investigates the impact of decision maker’s investment in the ambidextrous sustainable 
innovations on the measures of supply chain performance using five different two-period 
game structures, viz. wholesale price contract, vertical Nash game, cost sharing contract, 
revenue sharing contract, and two-part tariff contract. The study compares the results of 
period one and period two, and discusses the nature of changes in the optimal level of 
decision parameters. Further, the study demonstrates the impact of market sensitivity 
 
towards sustainable innovation and its cost parameter on optimal level of decision 
parameters of the two-period models. Finally, this study investigates the impacts of 
exploratory and exploitative nature of innovation on the decision parameters of the two-
period contract models. The results demonstrate that a suitably designed 2PT contract can be 
used for coordination of a decentralised supply chain. A sensitivity analysis is performed for 
sustainability cost parameter, consumer sensitivity to sustainable innovation and cost 
reduction coefficient.  
Based on the analysis of the results, we submit that in ongoing business relationships, the 
promise of future rewards, may provide incentives for good behaviour today. Here we refer 
the ‘good behaviour’ as ‘environmentally responsible manufacturing’. Some gains from the 
investment in sustainable innovations are noticed after a time lag, particularly for the case of 
exploratory innovations. This provides justification for considering multi-period setting for 
the supply chain coordination using the sustainable investment. Furthermore, the study 
reveals that the investment in sustainable innovation is significantly lower in the second 
period. There is no future period available to receive benefits of the investment in this period 
and the manufacture invests less in this period. Therefore, we propose that consideration of 
long-term gain perspective can incentivize the manufacturer to put their investment more in 
the sustainable innovations. Moreover, as the innovation literature agrees that for the 
exploratory innovations, the fruits can only be reaped after a time lag. By considering only a 
single period setting, the manufacture may not be willing to invest in the exploratory 
sustainable innovations. By considering a two period setting, the long term perspective for 
sustainability is incorporated in our model. The manufacturer may be willing to invest in 
exploratory sustainable innovations to reap long term benefits. We believe that this is the 
first study to incorporate the two period setting for ambidextrous sustainable innovation. 
Table 3 summarises the key research findings and their managerial implications.  
In this study, we considered linear deterministic demand curve for our analysis. Various 
other types of demand functions such as nonlinear, stochastic etc. can be used in future 
studies. Further, this study assumes deterministic impact of the exploratory and exploitative 
innovation on the market potential and the marginal cost of manufacturer. The model can be 
extended under stochastic impact of ambidextrous sustainable innovation, i.e. exploratory 
and exploitative innovation both. Although the study considers the full information scenario, 
one can extend the study considering information asymmetry cases of demand information 
and cost information or the both. Additionally, this model can be extended for closed loop 
supply chain. This study excludes the discounting factor, uncertainty and moral hazard. The 
 
discounting factor, uncertainty and moral hazard can be further explored using multi-
periodic coordination model. 
Table 3:  Findings and implications 
Research question Findings Managerial / Policy implications 
How an analytical 








We have designed and demonstrated 
the effectiveness to two-period contract 
models with simultaneous 
consideration of exploratory and 
exploitative nature of environmental 
innovations. For modelling two-period 
contract, five different contract types 
have been used. 
The equilibrium results presented in 
Table 2 can help managers to 
optimise the supply chain based on 
the two-period contract model. 
In a dyadic supply 






measures of supply 
chain performance? 
And, in which 
contract structure, 
the supply chain 
performance is 
better? 
The manufacture’s investment in 
ambidextrous sustainable 
(environmental) innovation increases 
the demand, level of sustainability in 
the product, profit of supply chain 
agent and total supply chain profit, that 
improves the supply chain efficiency. 
Two-part tariff contract coordinates the 
supply chain with channel efficiency 
equivalent to centralised decision 
making. revenue sharing contract 
partially coordinates the supply chain 
and performs better than the cost 
sharing contract. The channel 
efficiency is the lowest in the wholesale 
price contract. 
Firms should invest in the 
environmental innovation to improve 
the level of sustainability. For perfect 
channel coordination, the firms 
should consider a two-part tariff 
contract. 
What will be 
changes in optimal 
level of decision 
parameters of a 
two-period contract 
The optimal level of investment in the 
sustainable innovation is higher in the 
first period as compared to the second 
period in the two-period setting. The 
retail price and demand of product is 
The reason for the same is the time 
lag for the benefit due to the 
exploratory and exploitative 
innovation. The exploratory 








higher in the second period than the 
first period. The profit of the 
manufacturer, retailer, and supply chain 
is higher in the second period than the 
first period.   
whereas the exploratory innovation 
leads to new product development 
and generation of new markets (e.g., 
the base of the pyramid). Since no 
future period is attached to the second 
period, managers tend to invest less in 
the second period. This result 
provides insights regarding 
consideration of a long-term 
perspective for the sustainable 
investment. A short term perspective 
inhibits the investment in the 
sustainable innovation. 




innovation and its 
cost parameters on 
the measures of 
supply chain 
performance in a 
two-period contract 
model? 
The consumer sensitivity to sustainable 
innovation (α) varies with the 
manufacturer’s profit for different 
contract types and time periods. The 
consumer sensitivity to the sustainable 
innovation has increasing impact on the 
retail price, order quantity, and profit of 
the retailer. The retail price, order 
quantity, level of sustainability 
decreases with an increase in the 
sustainable cost parameter.  
Firms should invest to increase the 
consumers’ awareness about the 
sustainable products and 
sustainability performance of the 
firms. These can be accomplished 
through advertisements and 
promotional activities. Government 
can provide subsidies to the firms to 
lower the level of the cost parameter 
of sustainable innovation.   
What is the impact 
of exploratory and 
exploitative nature 
of environmental 
innovation on the 
measures of supply 
chain performance 
in a two-period 
contract model? 
Due to exploratory nature of 
innovation, the profit of the 
manufacturer slightly increases and 
decreases in the first period. However, 
it increases in the second period with 
an increase in the market development 
coefficient. In case of the retailer, the 
impact of the market development 
coefficient depends on the type of the 
contract. Due to the exploitative nature 
of the sustainable innovation, the retail 
The results obtained in this study can 
help the decision makers to take 
decision on investment in the 
ambidextrous sustainable innovation 
under different types of contract 
structures.  
 
price, order quantity, and level of 
sustainability increases with an increase 
in the level of cost reduction coefficient 
(𝛽). In the first period, the profit of the 
manufacturer decreases with an 
increases in the cost reduction 
coefficient, while in the second period, 
it is found to increase with an increase 
in 𝛽. 𝛽 has non-decreasing impact on 
difference between the second period 
and first period profit of the retailer.  
 
Appendix A: Appendix 
Appendix A.1: Alias 
𝐺1 = {𝛼
5(𝛼2 − 10𝐼) − 6𝛾𝐼(𝛼2 − 4𝐼)2 + 12𝛼𝐼2(𝐼 + 2𝛼2)},  
𝐺2 = [6𝐼(𝛼
2 − 4𝐼)(𝛽 + 𝛾)2 − (𝛼2 − 6𝐼)3], 𝐺3 = (6I-α






2{𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 𝛾)2} + (𝛽 + 𝛾){𝛼(4𝐼 − 𝛼2) − 4𝐼(𝛽 + 𝛾)} + 12𝐼(3𝐼 − 𝛼2)] 
𝐻2 = [1 +
𝛼
𝐺2
{𝛼5 + 6𝐼{2𝐼(3𝛼 + 2𝛽 + 2𝛾) − 𝛼2(2𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾)}}] 
𝐻3 = [𝛼
2{𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 𝛾)2} + (𝛽 + 𝛾){𝛼(4𝐼 − 𝛼2) − 4𝐼(𝛽 + 𝛾)} + 12𝐼(3𝐼 − 𝛼2)] 
𝐻4 = [𝛼
5 + 6𝐼{2𝐼(3𝛼 + 2𝛽 + 2𝛾) − 𝛼2(2𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾)}] 
𝐻5 = [
2𝛼{6𝐼𝛽(4𝐼 − 𝛼2)2 − 𝐺1}
(4𝐼 − 𝛼2)𝐺2
+




(𝛽 + 𝛾 − 2𝛼){(𝛽 + 𝛾)2 + 4𝛼2} + 4𝛼(8𝐼 + 𝛼2)






(𝑎 − 𝑐)[{𝛼(𝛽 + 𝛾) + 16𝐼}2 + 16𝐼{𝛼(𝛽 + 𝛾) − 3𝛼2 − 3(𝛽 + 𝛾)2}]
2[(16𝐼 − 3𝛼2)2 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)2(48𝐼 − 𝛼2)]
 
𝐾2 = [
𝛼{16𝐼(𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾) − 3𝛼2}
{(16𝐼 − 3𝛼2)2 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)2(48𝐼 − 𝛼2)}
] 
𝐾3 =
(𝑎 − 𝑐)[{𝛼(𝛽 + 𝛾) + 16𝐼}2 + 16𝐼{𝛼(𝛽 + 𝛾) − 3𝛼2 − 3(𝛽 + 𝛾)2}]
3[(16𝐼 − 3𝛼2)2 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)2(48𝐼 − 𝛼2)]
 
𝐾4 =
𝛼2{21𝛼2 + (𝛽 + 𝛾)(4𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾)} − 16𝐼{3𝛼2 + 4(𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾)2}
4[(16𝐼 − 3𝛼2)2 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)2(48𝐼 − 𝛼2)]
 
𝐾5 =
128𝐼(𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾)2 + 𝛼2{144𝐼 − 51𝛼2 − 3(𝛽 + 𝛾)2}
4[(16𝐼 − 3𝛼2)2 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)2(48𝐼 − 𝛼2)]
 
𝑇1 = [{4(𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾)𝐼 − 𝛼
3}{4(4𝐼 − 𝛼2) − 3(𝛽 + 𝛾)2}] 
𝑇2 = [(𝛽 + 𝛾)
2{(𝛽 + 𝛾)(𝛽 + 𝛾 − 𝛼) − 4(4𝐼 − 𝛼2)} + 4(4𝐼 − 𝛼2){𝛼(𝛽 + 𝛾) + (4𝐼 − 𝛼2)}] 
𝑇3 = [{4(𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾)𝐼 − 𝛼
3}{2(4𝐼 − 𝛼2) − (𝛽 + 𝛾)2}] 
𝑇4 = [(𝛽 + 𝛾)
2{(𝛽 + 𝛾 − 𝛼)2 − 4(6𝐼 − 𝛼2)} + 2(4𝐼 − 𝛼2){3𝛼(𝛽 + 𝛾) + 4(4𝐼 − 𝛼2)}] 
𝑇5 = [(𝛽 + 𝛾)
2{(𝛽 + 𝛾 − 𝛼)2 − 4(6𝐼 − 𝛼2)} + 8(4𝐼 − 𝛼2){𝛼(𝛽 + 𝛾) + (4𝐼 − 𝛼2)}] 
Appendix A.2: Game constructs and solution approach of mathematical models 
 
 







Game construct Solution method: Backward induction method 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 2 Period 1 
1 Centralised 
Centralised supply 
chain decide 𝑝1, 𝜃1 
Centralised supply 





















M decides 𝑤1, 𝜃1 and R 
decides 𝑝1 
simultaneously 
M decides 𝑤2, 𝜃2 and 






































M decides 𝑤1, 𝜃1 →        
R decides 𝑝1 
M decides 𝑤2, 𝜃2 →    








































R decides 𝜓1 →             
M decides 𝑤1, 𝜃1 →        
R decides 𝑝1 
R decides 𝜓2 →             
M decides 𝑤2, 𝜃2 →        









Subject to,  (𝑤2, 𝜃2) =
argmax




   𝑤2,𝜃2
{(𝑤2 − 𝑐2)𝑞2 −
(1 − 𝜓2)𝛼𝜃2
2} 




















Subject to,    

























R decides 𝜙1 →             
M decides 𝑤1, 𝜃1 →        
R decides 𝑝1 
R decides 𝜙2 →             
M decides 𝑤2, 𝜃2 →        










(𝑤2, 𝜃2) = argmax




   𝑤2,𝜃2
{(1
− 𝜙2)𝑝2𝑞2
+ (𝑤2 − 𝑐2)𝑞2 − 𝛼𝜃2
2} 








− 𝑤1𝑞1 + 𝜋2
𝑅} 
Subject to, 


































M decides 𝐿1, 𝜃1 →        
R decides 𝑝1 
M decides 𝐿2, 𝜃2 →    









2 + 𝑙2} 





   argmax
𝑞2,𝑙2
{(𝑝2 −






















𝑤1)𝑞1 − 𝑙1 +
𝜋2
𝑅} ≥ 2?̅?𝑅 
 
WSP: Wholesale price; CSC: Cost sharing contract; RSC: Revenue sharing contract; 2PT: Two-part tariff contract; VN: 
Vertical Nash game; M: Manufacturer; R: Retailer 
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